



THE MACEDONIAN NAME AFFAIR

A RESEARCH ON THE HISTORICAL,
POLITICAL AND CULTURAL ELEMENTS
OF THE CEASELESS DISPUTE.

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Abstract

The main purpose of this research paper is to bring forth and examine the fundamental causes of the ongoing and burgeoning conflict between what is currently legally defined as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the country of Greece. To attain a wholesome understanding of the said dispute, this exploration will strip the conflict void of its intricacies, paradoxically by analyzing the historical, political and cultural events from both a realistic and emblematic lens.

Through this capturing of past and present occurrences, the sinew connecting these two kindred yet ultimately disparate countries will be revealed and deconstructed, only to reveal the dormant problem of territorial insecurity that divulge the humane urge of upheaving possessions-whether tangible or not- for the societal grail that is power.

Introduction

The Republic of Macedonia, a country belonging to the Balkan Peninsula and located in Southeast Europe, has had a long, tedious and ceaseless history of conflict with its meridional neighbor, Greece. To summarize, Macedonia -as a name- is formally and legally in use for Greece's geographically largest and perhaps historically most prominent region which is positioned on the northern part of the country. Right above it, with a separate cultural identity, language and history, yet partially shared name, is the country known as the Republic of Macedonia. Despite one entity being a region and the other a country and despite the grand omission of similitude between their language, history and culture, the indistinguishable nature of the naming quota leads to issues much more significant than perhaps immediately perceivable. These issues, nevertheless, are to be expected in a conflict that contains such a vast multidisciplinary scope and warrants an extensive study from scholars of all fields-be it anthropological, historical, economic etc.

And yet, the undercurrent of the dispute orbits the three key factors to be analyzed: the history, politics and culture of both nations with economic and legislative factors being essential additives to their, and the whole topic's, understanding.

Historical Schism from Yugoslavia and its Correlation to Greece

Possessing what can arguably be disputed as one of the most onerous historical and geographical changes imposed on them amongst its peer Balkan countries, the Republic of Macedonia and its people has had a rich history of instability and consequently lack of a solid national foundation right from the very start of the 20th century. To begin with, the geographical region of the modern-day Republic of Macedonia and the region's Bulgarian features were usurped by Serbia ensuing the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913¹ and given, almost prophetically, a fleeting name: 'South Serbia'. Alongside a proper identification, the newly defined southern Serbs had their educational system, churches and even dialect interdicted under an anti-Bulgarian campaign controlled by the Serbians and Greeks. By 1929, Serbia's increasing number of colonies led to the Kingdom, now regarded as Yugoslavia, to be

¹ "Balkan Wars." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 26 June 2018, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balkan_Wars.

divided amongst 'banovinas'² -divisional provinces- with the modern Republic of Macedonia clasping onto yet another transitory name, the Vardar Benovina of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia³. Meanwhile, Greece was instating policies which persecuted Slavic dialect along with any form of cultural expression and had signed population exchange agreements with Bulgaria in order to obliterate any affiliation between the nations prior to the interwar period in 1934. During said period, the seed of a united and independent 'Macedonia'- which later became the ideology and objective of Macedonian Nationalism- was sprouted amongst the citizens of the former Yugoslav region and promoted by regional freedom-fighters such as Todor Aleksandrov⁴ and Ivan Mihailov⁵, especially notable being the incitements of World War I and II Commander in Chief Tito. By 1934, this image of freedom came closer to becoming reality as the Comintern (Communist International), which was considered an 'authoritative international organization'⁶, issued an official document that, for the first time, recognized the Republic of Macedonia and its language as an independent establishment. This and events such as the second World War and the passing of the Socialist Yugoslavia period that followed allowed for the seed that had initially been planted within the nation during the interbellum to fully germinate. The 8th of September 1991 marks a revolutionary change for the Republic of Macedonia as they declare their independence from Yugoslavia, finally becoming autonomous.

Macedonia's detached and independent nature became a threat to Greece's northern regions, however, as their names were becoming desirable candidates for the newly established Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The threat was especially prevalent for the region of 'Macedonia', where the foregoing *Macedonians* whose 'historical and cultural heritage'⁷ was unquestionably Greek, resided in; From Greece's perspective, by desiring the region's name, the former Yugoslavs were expropriating part of the Greek identity. With this and the fruitless two-year negotiation

² "Balkan Wars." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 26 June 2018, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balkan_Wars.

³ "Vardar Banovina." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 19 June 2018, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vardar_Banovina.

⁴ "Todor Aleksandrov." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 26 June 2018, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Todor_Aleksandrov.

⁵ "Ivan Mihailov." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 26 June 2018, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivan_Mihailov.

⁶ "Resolution of the Comintern on the Macedonian Question." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 27 June 2018, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resolution_of_the_Comintern_on_the_Macedonian_Question.

⁷ Staff, Investopedia. "Trade Sanction." *Investopedia*, Investopedia, 12 Jan. 2018, www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tradesanction.asp.

attempts in mind, Greece imposed a unilateral economic embargo⁸, an official ban on trade and commercial activity against the independent state of Macedonia on February 1994 which fundamentally impeded the latter's access to regional and international organizations⁹ and posed as a political and economic chaotic consequence. From that year on, this dispute became caustic internationally and encouraged the involvement of foreign parties, particularly that of the United States. In September 1995, after both nations endured substantial financial downfalls, Greece lifted its one-year embargo and, along with FYROM, agreed on the Interim Accord which in broad terms disallows the use of the 16-pointed Star of Vergina (a crest of Philip's and Alexander the Great's lineage) as the Macedonian flag¹⁰, expunges territorial aspiration and interdicts historical appropriation, all which ought to have coaxed both Greece and FYROM to maintain diplomatic relations under the auspices of the UN and has become a treaty that is still being enforced today¹¹.

Between 1995 to 2008 there was a curious stalemate regarding the name dispute with Greece continuously suggesting new names lacking the term 'Macedonia' and FYROM repeatedly denying every proposal without the term and without sign of compromise. By 2012 Greece began popularizing the Latin term "erga omnes"¹² concerning the name of FYROM, which literally translates to the Roman legislative term 'against all' but in this case connotes 'for all purposes': basically, an appeal that the Macedonian culture and executive forces ought to relinquish their right to identify themselves in a clear and lucid manner to all, for domestic and international purposes¹³. The dispute constitutes a national affair of equal vitality and graveness for both Greece and the Republic of Macedonia, and possesses a continuously evolving temperament which, to this very day, exhibits no promising coda; In 2018, Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras and his Macedonian counterpart Zoran Zaev have agreed upon the name of 'Severna Makedonija' (North Macedonia), a consensus that has gained

⁸ Staff, Investopedia. "Trade Sanction." *Investopedia*, Investopedia, 12 Jan. 2018, www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tradesanction.asp.

⁹ Craven, Mathew CR. "The Name Issue Revisited." *Research Portal*, Lund University, 2013, portal.research.lu.se/ws/files/5604454/4250119.pdf.

¹⁰ Reuters. "Macedonia Embargo Is Halted by Greece." *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 16 Oct. 1995, www.nytimes.com/1995/10/16/world/macedonia-embargo-is-halted-by-greece.html.

¹¹ "FYROM Name Issue." *Greek*, www.mfa.gr/en/fyrom-name-issue/.

¹² "Τι Είναι Τελικά Το «Erga Omnes»; (Pics)." *E-Daily.gr*, 29 Aug. 2018, www.e-daily.gr/themata/109227/ti-einai-telika-to-erga-omnes-pics.

¹³ Staff, Investopedia. "Trade Sanction." *Investopedia*, Investopedia, 12 Jan. 2018, www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tradesanction.asp.

monumental support from third-party countries and organizations but received backlash from both countries due to the agreement's inherent 'treasonous' nature that goes against any form of Greek and former Yugoslavian patriotism. And thus, the dispute today appears to take two steps backwards with every one step forward; for any actual development to occur, one of the two nations will ultimately fully have to conform and either agree to not include the term 'Macedonia' (as Greece intends), or accept its use formally and legally under all situations (as FYROM requests).

Political pivots between Greece and FYROM

Upon even slight inspection of the Macedonian name affair, any doubt of it being politically driven is demolished and any argument disputing this, non-viable. The civic functions of the dispute are extensively convoluted, rooted in the historical aspects and events as well as the occurrences of the contemporary scene belonging to both FYROM and Greece. Due to this topic's expansive scope, therefore, political events preliminary to the economic embargo in 1994 (such as the Resolution of the Comintern) will not be discussed, as their influence on the topic of hand can be considered slight and dated in comparison to the issues that will be analyzed.

The Economic Trade Embargo

The years between 1992 and 1994 proved to be tempestuous not just because of the unavailing attempts of negotiation between Greece and FYROM but for the whole EU which underwent multiple presidential changes in the said, ultimately limited, time span. February 1994 was climacteric, nonetheless, as the Greek prime minister- Andreas Papandreou- imposed a trade embargo (which could colloquially be defined as trade-lobbying) prohibiting any non-humanitarian exports 'bound for FYROM via Greek ports of entry'¹⁴. While this act received positive responses from the Greek citizens due to its figurative nationalistic stance, EU and NATO's consequent indignation was a catalyst for the injunction proposed by them to the European Court of Justice against the embargo for 'gravely breaching EU law'¹⁵. In June that same

¹⁴Library of Congress. "Greece The Macedonian Dispute - Flags, Maps, Economy, History, Climate, Natural Resources, Current Issues, International Agreements, Population, Social Statistics, Political System." *Photius*, 2004, photius.com/countries/greece/government/greece_government_the_macedonian_dispu-201.html.

¹⁵"European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release - THE COMMISSION DECIDES TO REFER THE GREEK EMBARGO OF THE FORMERYUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA TO THE

year, the court rejected the request of injunction which resulted in the enhancement of patriotism amongst the Greeks and the resentment of the former Yugoslavs. Fearing the outcome of their own (mostly economic) deficit that may arise from the affair, the US involved themselves with the matter yet even the interference and attempted mediation of their own diplomats, Cyrus R. Vance and Matthew Nimetz¹⁶, proved to be nugatory. During this diplomatic period following the embargo, both Greece and FYROM were facing financial complications: In Skopje (FYROM's capital) the chief issues that arose from the embargo were the inability to obtain raw materials which led to the shutting down of multiple factories and sequential incapability of certain markets functioning (which additionally resulted in the unemployment of citizens), as well as FYROM's limitation of trade¹⁷. Specifically, FYROM was suffering from U.N sanctions alongside the Greek plight which caused their transportation costs to soar and neighboring trade confederates to no longer partake in trafficking activities with them, as importing and exporting was limited to the eastern and western parts of FYROM- the northern and southern regions both being hostile to the country (Yugoslavia and Greece accordingly). Greece, on the other hand, was contending with foreign pressure to lift the embargo whilst confronting a mild deterioration of their own economy; with these reverberations as consequence, Greece lifted its embargo on October 1995, nineteen-months after its initial employment, through the agreement of the Interim Accord.

Interim Accord

The Interim Accord, signed by Greece and FYROM in New York on the 13th of September 1995, was one of the primal conciliatory and pacifying agreements to ever be instated in regard to this affair. Following the disastrous effects of the embargo, the accord- which consisted of 23 articles- served almost as a peace treaty that mitigated the provocative aspects that the two countries had established for one another and

EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE." *European Union*, Publications Office of the European Union, europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-94-278_en.htm.

¹⁶ Reports, From Times Wire. "Greece, Macedonia Lose Mediator Vance." *Los Angeles Times*, Los Angeles Times, 24 Dec. 1999, articles.latimes.com/1999/dec/24/news/mn-47039.

¹⁷ Vogel, Steve. "GREEK BLOCKADE, U.N. EMBARGO THREATEN MACEDONIA'S FUTURE." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 25 May 1994, www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/05/25/greek-blockade-un-embargo-threaten-macedonias-future/ba3ebab3-8035-44cd-8853-4f0f7b768b23/?utm_term=.598469b36207.

provided a scaffolding for the political activities that were to transpire between them from that point on. The 23 articles, ordered and simplified, stated that:

1. Greece recognizes FYROM as 'an independent and sovereign state' and will institute continuous diplomatic relations; Greece ought to also establish a liaison office in Skopje and FYROM a liaison office in Athens.
2. The signatories are to respect existing borders.
3. Both parties are to respect the territorial integrity of the other.
4. Both signatories would refrain from violence or threat of violence.
5. Both will continue to cooperate under the auspices of the UN.
6. FYROM to declare that its constitution does not include the basis of claim to Greece.
7. Parties are to discourage and deter hostile activities and propaganda by State-controlled organizations as well as individual acts of rebellion; FYROM is also to cease using the Vergina Sun in their flag.
8. None of the two signatories are to impose obstructions on people or goods of the opposite signatory.
9. They are to be guided by legislative, political, humanistic and democratic principles
10. Contact between the countries is to be encouraged.
11. Greece has no right to object in FYROM's involvement with 'international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions' of which Greece is a part of.
12. Both parties are to agree to legal, judicial and hydro-economic decisions in area of mutual interest.
13. In relation to article 12, UN law will guide the two countries.
14. Economic cooperation is to be enforced, particularly on the basis of road, rail, air transport and communication links; additional allowance of 'visas, work permits, 'green-card[s]' insurance, air space transit and economic cooperation' is to be promoted.
15. The countries are to cooperate in the transaction of their united economic fields.
16. The scientific and technological industries are to improve with the assistance of one another.
17. Environmental issues should be handled harmoniously and in the near future.

18. "The parties shall cooperate in alleviating the consequences of disasters".
19. Tourism, custom, border formalities and border crossing improvements to be made in cooperation.
20. Parties shall work together against crimes, terrorism, and any illegal activities.
21. "The parties shall settle any disputes exclusively by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the UN"; any dispute that may arise may be submitted to the International Court of Justice.
22. The Interim Accord is directed exclusively towards these two countries and does not affect third-party states/institutions/countries.
23. This accord will be enforced after it is signed; It shall also remain in force until 'superseded by a definitive agreement'

The agreement included several articles that were already tacitly instated and others that were of no grave importance. Under the accord, however, Greece agreed to no longer interfere or object to the Republic's involvement in international organizations [Article 11] and the Republic respectively would remove the Vergina Sun from its flag [Article 7] along with any professed 'irredentist clauses'¹⁸ (depicting geographical aspirations) from its constitution [Article 6.2]- all, conditions which were and continue to be of utmost significance to both countries and the affair.

Furthermore, the last article reproduces the whole identity of the accord, as it includes a statement which allows for the revocation of the agreement that, by definition, innately strips the Interim Accord of its position as a 'traditional' treaty (which by legal terms cannot be superseded/revoked). The unconventionality of the agreement, its inability to be set in stone due to its unpredictable and awkward temperament, directly reflects the whole naming dispute at hand as well; even the omission of any clear identification of the countries within the pact, that were instead referred to as 'Party of the First Part' and 'Party of the Second Part' for Greece and FYROM respectively, was a prescient indicator of the affair's continual instability.

From 1995 to 2008 there was a (somewhat) established serenity concerning the Interim Accord, between Greece's and FYROM's *governments*. The people, on the other hand, argue that the opposite country continuously violated their agreements.

¹⁸"Macedonia Naming Dispute." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 2 Sept. 2018, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonia_naming_dispute.

Greeks claim that the accord has been breached through the acts of renaming Skopje's airport to 'Alexander the Great' (a prominent Greek figure from the Greek region of Macedonia) [Article 6], using the name 'Republic of Macedonia' in international organizations where entry was granted to FYROM only under the provisional name of 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', the lack of suppression on rebellions/provocations against Greece [particularly disrespecting the Greek flag by replacing the orthodox cross with a swastika] [Article 7] and more such acts¹⁹.

Oppositely, FYROM's civilians and government have been mostly concerned with the contravention of the accord's 11th article, particularly when Greece blocked Macedonia's accession to NATO on April 2008.

UN, EU and NATO Membership

One of FYROM's greatest concerns, if not the greatest, from the very beginning of the naming dispute up until extant developments, is its formal and legal acceptance into international institutions and organizations which would ultimately grant them 'social inclusion, local governance and environmental protection'²⁰. Yet most importantly, inclusion in said organizations would implicitly conquer FYROM's reputation as a dependent state and, almost thirty years after their declaration of independence, would finally validate their autonomous character.

The first such institution to perform negotiations with FYROM, were the United Nations (UN). By the end of 1922, after completely disregarding Greece's intransigence on popularizing the term 'Macedonia' for the 18-month independent Republic, the Macedonian Assembly issued a membership application within the UN that was accepted on the 7th of April 1993 under the condition that the provisional name 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' is adopted to refer to the Republic (a requirement that -as previously mentioned- Greeks claim to have been broken on multiple occasions). This inclusion granted under the UN Council Resolution 817²¹ did not provide FYROM with any monumental advantages but it did become the first official recognition for the country by such a large-scale committee.

¹⁹ "FYROM Name Issue." *Greek*, June 2018, www.mfa.gr/en/fyrom-name-issue/.

²⁰ "United Nations." *UNEP | United Nations*, www.un.mk/.

²¹ "United Nations Security Council Resolution 817." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 26 Aug. 2018, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_817.

By 2002, FYROM's president Boris Trajkovski took the opportunity that was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) enlargement scheme to petition for a position within the institution. In response, NATO had intended to accept FYROM but was vetoed by Greece at the 2008 Bucharest Summit (also known as The 20th NATO Summit) on the repeated basis of territorial aspiration. It is important to note that the United States, a colossal and highly influential member of NATO, had previously undercut Macedonia's position because of reluctance of establishing full diplomatic relations (following 'Greek-American political pressure'²²), which had resulted in many of FYROM's neighboring countries 'drawing inappropriate conclusions, saying the U.S. is refraining' [from relations with FYROM] and thus the countries themselves pulling out from trade or close-association with the republic²³. With this in mind, NATO's denial of FYROM's establishment because of Greece's presence caused the stalemate that had ensued between the two latter countries to crack and prompted FYROM to apply to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against Greece on the foundation that Article 11 of the Interim Accord had been breached. While the ICJ did find Greece violating its obligation to the Interim Accord (Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece))²⁴ in the court case that ensued in 2011, NATO unanimously and collectively agreed that FYROM will not attain a membership unless the name issue with Greece is resolved, thus having the republic's position remain as pending to this very day. FYROM's rapprochement further expanded after their petition to NATO, when they submitted their application for a European Union (EU) membership on the 22nd of March 2004 in Dublin, Ireland²⁵. Once again, Greece remained a prime barrier in FYROM's accession (which they vetoed a year after they lodged FYROM's enrollment to NATO) due to the name issue still not have been settled, with the Greek minister of foreign affairs – Dora Bakoyiannis – declaring "...the Hellenic Parliament, under any

²² Vogel, Steve. "GREEK BLOCKADE, U.N. EMBARGO THREATEN MACEDONIA'S FUTURE." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 25 May 1994, www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/05/25/greek-blockade-un-embargo-threaten-macedonias-future/ba3ebab3-8035-44cd-8853-4f0f7b768b23/?utm_term=.598469b36207.

²³ Vogel, Steve. "GREEK BLOCKADE, U.N. EMBARGO THREATEN MACEDONIA'S FUTURE." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 25 May 1994, www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/05/25/greek-blockade-un-embargo-threaten-macedonias-future/ba3ebab3-8035-44cd-8853-4f0f7b768b23/?utm_term=.598469b36207.

²⁴ International Court of Justice. *Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)*. 5 Dec. 2011. *INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE*.

²⁵ "Accession of Macedonia to the European Union." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 29 Aug. 2018, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Macedonia_to_the_European_Union.

composition, will not ratify the accession of the neighbouring country to the EU and NATO if the name issue is not resolved beforehand"²⁶. The EU, out of respect for the Greek membership, has preserved alluding to FYROM as such, rather than the conventional 'Republic of Macedonia', and have agreed to deny membership to said country until the dispute's conclusion.

With both the EU and NATO denying any accessional negotiations to FYROM until the development and resolve of the naming dispute, FYROM's positioned was detained as stagnant in both its transatlantic but also general expansional attempts. That was until the 12th of June 2018.

Prespa Agreement

The Prespa agreement, signed on the 12th of June 2018, is a memorandum of understanding ("a type of agreement...indicating an intended common line of action"²⁷) between Greece and FYROM to allow the usage of 'Republika Severna Makedonija' or 'Republic of North Macedonia', *erga omnes*. Along with the implementation of the name, the proposal encompasses the recognition of the 'Macedonian' language in the UN, the referral of the citizens of FYROM as 'Macedonians'²⁸ with the elucidations that said citizens are not related to the Ancient Macedonians who are clearly Greek, the removal of the Greek veto on the accessional talks of NATO and the EU with FYROM, as well as the wholesome removal of the Vergina sun from any form of public use in FYROM ²⁹(which ought to have already been implemented under the Interim Accord of 1995 [Article 7.2]).

The reactions to this consensus were positive coming from the 'international community' but the internal workings of the two-signatory countries were set ablaze: On FYROM's side, their head of state, Gjorge Ivanov, refused to sign the 'disastrous' and 'illegal'³⁰ agreement and right-wing organizations are setting forth public protests,

²⁶ "Macedonia Naming Dispute." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 2 Sept. 2018, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonia_naming_dispute.

²⁷ "Memorandum of Understanding." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 20 Aug. 2018, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memorandum_of_understanding.

²⁸ I need to clarify that the use of quotations in these sentences are incorporated only because, as a Greek, I fully abhor the apathy and neglect our 'left'-leaning president Tsipras showed the citizens of Greece through this anti-nationalistic agreement.

²⁹ "Macedonia Naming Dispute." *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 2 Sept. 2018, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonia_naming_dispute#Prespa_agreement

³⁰ "Σκοπιανό: Τι Θα Γίνει Με Την Συμφωνία Μετά Το Μπλόκο Του Ιβάνοφ." *Ελεύθερος Τύπος*, 26 June 2018, www.eleftherostypos.gr/diethni/256098-skopiano-ti-tha-ginei-me-tin-symfonia-meta-to-bloko-tou-ivanov/.

and in Greece, both the alt-right *Golden Dawn* (GD) party and the alt-left *Communist Party of Greece* (KKE) oppose the memorandum and have gone to threatening lengths to stop further action from ensuing.

The state of this agreement is, hence, currently highly volatile and cannot be said to be formally enforced, regardless of what Tsipras and Zaev may suggest. It is also at a very early stage of development, awaiting growth and expansion in the days, months and years to come, as the Macedonian Name Affair is surely set to run for much longer than the head of states imply, especially in regard to its political involvement.

Dimensions of Cultural Potency

The cultural identity of a country has previously been the driving of so many bilateral wars and is a factor that must be taken into great consideration.

Therefore, this section aims to examine not only the cultural factors that have had an influence of the dispute, but also how the culture perceives determining events of the affair.

Historical Tension

The historical tension that has manifested itself with this affair revolves around three key factors: terminology, symbolism, and historical figures which all possess direct correlation with events that have transpired.

To begin with, when referring to terminology, the name *Macedonia* itself is chief. Etymologically, the name comes from the ancient Greeks who described their regional Macedonians

Territorial Aspirations (geographical)

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